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Although there is a wide recognition of the importance of informal financial markets 
(IFMs) in developing economies, their role in the development process3 is the subject 
of controversy. One school of thought contends that IFMs are fragmented and 
dominated by usurious money lenders who exploit their market power. IFMs therefore 
play a negative role in economic development and should be absorbed into the formal 
sector during the financial development process. In the meantime, government policy 
should aim to restrict the activities of IFMs4. The opposing view claims that IFMs 
maintain very low transaction costs because of their comparative advantage in 
information acquisition and lower administrative costs. They are thus both competitive 
and agile5 and improve the allocative efficiency of the loanable funds market. This 
informational advantage may also enable the informal sector to extend credit to those 
who have fallen outside the remit of the formal financial sector. This school of thought 
would therefore suggest that informal financial markets should be protected from 
arduous government intervention and regulation6. 
It is argued that these disparate conclusions derive in part from a disagreement about 
what is meant by IFMs. This confusion arises firstly because informal financial 
transactions, by their very nature, occur outside the domain of the legal system. Thus 
little reliable and systematic evidence is available for detailed scrutiny. Secondly, the 
activities of the informal sector are often defined in a residual manner, namely 'all 
activity that lies beyond the pale of official regulation or control is considered to be 
informal in nature'7. Treating informal financial activity as a residual is partly 
responsible for the lack of in depth analysis in the financial development literature. 
Thirdly, the understanding of the operation of IFMs is influenced by a limited number 
For a review of the arguments of the neo-liberals and neo-structuralists regarding the activities of IFMs, see Fry (1988). 
This is clearly realised in the works of Goldsmith (1969), Shaw (1973) and Mckinnon (1973). 
6 
See Taylor (1983) p. 92. 
For further details of this view see, for example, Pischke, Adams and Donalds (1983). 
Montiel, Agénor and Haque (1993), p 8. 
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of empirical studies on informal fmance that are dominated by research in the Indian 
sub-continent. The generalisation of these findings to economies characterised by 
different economic and cultural environments gives an inaccurate view of the role of 
IFMs. Finally, labelling the informal financial sector by epithets such as 'black', 
'underground' and 'hidden' has resulted in this sector being subject to ideological 
debate. This has made it difficult to analyse the structure and role of IFMs impartially8. 
The aim of this paper is to remedy some of these shortcomings. It seeks to quantify 
both the size and the role of the informal financial sector and provide a more objective 
view of the role that IFMs play in the process of economic development. The country 
which has been chosen for this analysis is Egypt, since this provides both an economic 
and a cultural contrast to the other countries in which IFMs have been studied. Section 
2 begins by discussing the sampling frame that is used in this study in more detail, 
with section 3 presenting the basic findings regarding the relative sizes, in terms of 
activity, of the formal and informal financial markets. Section 4 then conducts a probit 
analysis to determine which factors affect whether or not a given individual will have a 
formal loan, with section 5 performing a similar exercise for the informal sector. 
Section 6 then compares the results obtained from the two sectors. As a corollary to 
this, section 7 then presents the results of a bivariate probit analysis which seeks to 
ascertain if any simple correlation exists between decisions taken in the formal sector 
and decisions taken in the informal sector. Finally, section 8 concludes by 
summarising what has been learnt about the role of IFMs in Egypt. 
8 
Monticl, Agenor and Haque (1993) pp 8-9. 
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2. The Data 
The data which is used in this paper is a sample of 200 households from four Egyptian 
Villages collected between mid-December 1992 and mid-April 1993g. The villages are 
situated in the district of Kafr Shukr, which is part of the Kalyoubbiya Governorate. 
This is a rural province of 1001 km2 in the Nile delta, 60 Kilometres north east of 
Cairo. The Kalyoubbiya Govemorat&s population was approximately 2.9 million in 
199210, a population density of 2513 persons/Km2. This is the fifth highest density for 
a Governorate in Egypt. 
Approximately 43 percent of Kalyoubbiya's population live in urban areas. Of the 
Governorate's urban population, some 66 percent live in the southern industrial area, 
close to Cairo, where some firms were first established in the second and third decades 
of this century. In the 1960s, during a period of heavy industrialisation, this area 
became one of the main industrial locations in Egypt. The remainder of the urban 
population lives in the Governorate's capital, Benha, and some other under-developed 
cities. Kalyoubbiya, like her neighbouring Governorates in the fertile delta11, is 
characterised by a high level of farm fragmentation and the prevalence of small 
land-holding (less than one feddan)'2. However, closeness to the Cairo market (which 
serves more than 12 million consumers), has led the agricultural sector of the 
Governorate to specialise in relatively high earning fruit and vegetables production, as 
well as poultry farming. 
During the last three decades several infrastructure projects were implemented to 
provide the inhabitants of the Govemorate, especially those who live in the urban 
areas, with tap water, electricity, schooling, health centres and district hospitals and a 
For a full description of the sampling methodology see Mohieldin (1993). 
Estimated for 1992 from 1986 Census. 
12 
See Commander (1987) p46 for a description of the main characteristics of three other govemorates in the delta. 
1 feddan = 24 qirats .43 hectares 1.038 acres. 
4 
reasonable network of roads. As a result, in addition to the common categorisation of 
regions to urban and rural, many parts of Kalyoubbiya can be described as semi-urban 
or semi-rural depending on the level of urbanisation and type of activities of the 
population. 
Kafr Shukr is an administrative district which was established in 1963. It occupies the 
North East part of the Governorate and consists of 24 villages, including 'Kafr Shukr', 
which has been given a city status since 1968. However, given the coexistence of 
urban and rural features, even Kafr Shukr should be considered semi-urban. 
Table (1) Population and Sample Size of the Four Villages 
Shulcr Asneat Menshat Shahawy 
Population(1986) 15144 8911 5859 1922 
Populaiion(1992)" 17257 11179 6676 2190 
NumbeiofHouseholds" 3522 2281 1362 446 
Sample Size 80 50 40 30 
Sample size / population % 2.27 2.19 293 6.72 
* Source: CAPMAS, National Census 1986. 
' Calculated for 1992 with 2.2 net average population growth rate. 
Household sample size is approximately 4.9 for the Kalyoubbiya Govemorate CAPMAS National Census (1986). 
Applying a two stage random sampling methodology, the first stage of the sampling 
procedure involved choosing 4 villages from the sampling frame of 24 villages in the 
district of Kafr Shukr. The selected villages were 'Al Menshat a! Kubra', 'Asneatç 
'Kafr El Shahawy' and 'Kafr Shuk.r', henceforth Menshat, Asneat, Shahawy and Shukr 
respectively. Details of the sampling from each village are given in Table 1. The 
questionnaire was designed to give a complete picture of the households' 
demographic characteristics, income, assets, living standards, portfolio selection, 
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preference of savings instruments and details of the households' financial transactions 
in the formal and the informal financial sectors. In an attempt to obtain high quality 
and comprehensive data on sensitive issues the number of villages and the size of the 
sample had to be kept small. 
3. Formal and Informal Finance in Rural Egypt 
The detailed results of the survey are summarised in Table 2. This shows that 22.5% 
of households had either deposit or current accounts with the formal banking sector, 
and 30% had formal sector loans. Only 6% of households had formal loans and 
deposits simultaneously. 
It is interesting to note that a higher proportion of the sample had links with the 
informal sector. Table 2 shows that 13% of the sample borrowed and lent 
simultaneously in the informal sector, 27% of the households extended informal credit 
to others without borrowing themselves, and 29.5% borrowed from others without 
lending. Thus, in total, 69.5% of households has some relation with the informal 
financial sector. Taken together, the survey reveals that 86% of the 200 households 
borrowed or lent in either the formal or the informal financial sectors. 
By focusing on the borrowing side, we find that the relative size of informal credit 
obtained by the households was small, amounting to 30.6% of total credit. Even after 
allowing for the fact that a single client received 34% of formal credit, it is still the 
case that informal loans tend to be smaller than formal loans. Informal credit is 
approximately 40.0% of total credit 
Note that this figure excludes tied credit and RoSCA funds. 
Table 2 Formal and Informal Transactions 





Lent 6 16.5 13 27 
Didn't Lend 24 53.5 29.5 30.5 
Note: Percentage of households in each cell; n=200. Source: Survey data. 
4. A Probit Analysis of the Formal Sector 
Whilst a wide variety of questions were asked of each household, the subset which 
will be the focus of the econometric analysis in the paper is given in the Appendix. 
This subset of the full dataset was chosen so as to give a comprehensive description 
both of the individuals who were borrowing funds (e.g. age, sex, educational level, 
occupation, marital status) and the households of which they were a member 
(household size, type of dwelling, ownership of dwelling). In addition, a wide variety 
of variables reflecting the financial position of the individual were included (level of 
income, level of savings, main source of income, total assets, ownership of land, 
ownership of gold). Finally, all respondents were asked if they had any strong reasons 
for not dealing with the formal financial sector. These subjective responses were 
included as regressors in an attempt to capture cultural and attitudinal variants which 
are not captured by the other variables. Thus, for example, 'religion' is a dummy 
variable which indicates that the individuals has strong religious objections to dealing 
with the formal financial sector. 
The parsimonious results of the probit estimation for the formal sector are given in 
Table 3 column 1. Only variables which achieved a least a 90% level of significance 
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were not excluded- the t-ratios for each variable are given in parentheses. Colunm two 
also lists the marginal effects for each of the variables and their t-ratios. 
The probit model of the formal sector is extremely well determined, with a pseudo R2 
of 0.9614. However, the LM statistic indicates that the null of no heteroskedasticity 
should be rejected, and so the parameter estimates and standard errors should be 
viewed with some caution. 
Financial variables prove to be an important determinant of whether or not an 
individual borrows from the sector. This may be explained by the fact that, in the 
formal sector, the financial institutions are primarily concerned with the ability of the 
individual to repay both the principal as well as the interest on a loan. Since the level 
of income is a key determinant of an individual's ability to repay it is perhaps not 
surprising to find that this variable is significant in the determination of whether or 
not the individual has a loan. The demand for loans may also be a positive function of 
the level of income. 
The fact that the assets of the individual may be used as collateral for a loan also 
helps to explain their presence in the formal loans equation. Likewise, in rural Egypt, 
agricultural land is also used by the banks as a surety. However, the regulations 
governing the land market mean that the renting of land from others is a valuable 
asset since the person can offer the productive claim on the land to the bank as 
collateral. Renting land from others is thus also an important determinant of whether 
or not the individual has a formal loan. 
14 the pseudo-R2 used in the analysis is that of McKelvey and Zavoina (1975). 
Table 3: Demand for loans in the formal sector 
coetTicient marginals coefticient marginals 
constant -5.1 6(-2.925) -O.29(- 1.178) -5.42(-3.058) -O.29(-1 .164) 
vilipees 
Shukr -l.08(-l.943) -0.61e-l(-l.141) -l.04(-1.81 1) -0.55e-l(-I.099) 
Shahawy 
Asneat -l .25(-1.947) -O.70e-l(-I .126) -1. 12(-i .691) -060(.1 .052) 
Menshat - I .03(-1 .692) -0.58e- I (-1 .109) -0.93(- 1.273) -0.44(-O.957) 
Individual characteristics 
female -2.68(-2. 148) .0.1 5(-l .192) -2.72(-2.203) -0.14(4.165) 
below general certificate 1.08(2.057) 0.61e-1(I.1 Ii) 1.09(2.038) O.58e-1(1.096) 
married/widowed -1 .64(-i .705) -0.92e-I (.1.218) - I .69(-l .789) -0.90e-1(-1 .209) 
income/ 1000 0.50(3.033) 0.28e- 1(1.515) 0.52(3.072) 0.28e-1 (1.456) 
(income/I 000)2 -0.82(.1 .802) -0.46e-3(-1 .463) .0.88e-2(.l .888) -0.47e-3(-1 .418) 
own land 1.37(3.603) 0.77e-1(i.l 16) 1.42(3.580) 0.76c-1(1.097) 
rent land from 2.13(3.783) 0.12(1.176) 2.12(3.706) 0.11(1.144) 
total assets/ 1000 -0.1 7e-I (-3.058) -0.97e-3(-I.125) -0.1 8e- I (-3.087) -O.97e-3(-1 .110) 
savingsl 1000 -0.99(-3.625) -0.55e-I (-1.378) -0.95(-3.498) -0.5 Ie-I( 1.327) 
loan rellised 2.28(2.695) 0.13(1.126) 2.30(2.716) 0.12(1.112) 
own gold 0.93(1.471) 0.52e-I(0.967) 1.10(1.655) 0.59e-I (1.000) 
Profession 
landlord/agricultural labourer 2.30(2.980) 0.13(1.280) 2.24(2.831) 0.12(1.240) 
merchant/trader 3.85(4.119) 0.22(1.248) 3.69(3.824) 0.20(1.205) 
government/public sector 2.94(3.945) 0.17(1.265) 2.95(3.874) 0.16(1.233) 
farmer 2.27(3.347) 0.13(1.267) 2.18(3.117) 0.12(1.229) 
Household characteristics 
household size 1.26(2.705) 0.7 ic-I (1.158) 1.23(2.610) 0.65e.1(1 .127) 
household size sq. -0.87(-2.474) -0.49e-2(-I.14I) -0.84e-I(-2.367) -0.45e-2(-1.I 10) 
Reasons for not dealing with the formal sector 
religious -2.29(4.175) .0.13(1.126) -2.35(4.091) -0. 12(-1 .203) 
distance 
1.34(2.377) 0.75e-I (1.190) 1.43(2.476) 0.76e.1(l .176) 
bureaucracyj 
treatment -2.07(-1 .841) -0.12(-I .134) -2.05(-I.797) -0.1 1(-I .110) 
bankruptcy - I .04(- 1.644) -O.73e-1(- 1.225) -I .06(- 1.663) -0.69e.1(-1.194) 
cost -1 .29(-2.804) -0.59(-i .070) -1 .29(-2.778) -0.60c-l(-1 .063) 
collateral -1 .04(-2. 131) -0.59e- I (-0.989) -1. 12(-2.246) -0.57e-I (-0.980) 
no need -3.00(.2.572) -0.1 7(-1 .201) -2.98(-2.537) -0.1 6(-I .161) 
informal loan 0.39(0.975) 0.21e-I(0.775) 
R2 0.96 0.96 
Heteroskedasticity 71.28 27 77.85 28 
t-ratios in brackets 
ligures in bold indicate degrees of freedom 
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Gold has only a marginally significant positive effect on the probability of having a 
formal loan. This would appear to indicate that it is not used as a form of collateral if 
the individual needs to borrow. It may be the case that some forms of assets are not 
recognised by the banks as collateral and are instead liquidated by the individual if 
they are in need of funds. Thus individuals are less likely to have a loan if they can 
either run down savings or non-collateral assets. 
A somewhat surprising result is that if an individual has been refused a loan in the 
past then they are more likely to have a loan now. This variable may however be 
acting as an indicator of potential willingness to participate in the formal sector. 
Table 3 also indicates that the profession of the individual is an important determinant 
of whether or not the individual has a formal loan. Why this should be is not 
completely clear, though it may be connected with the capital requirements of 
different jobs. Profession may also be used as an indicator by the banks of ability to 
repay. It appears that those individuals who have jobs which are either directly or 
indirectly related to agriculture are more likely to have a loan. Those who fall into 
the first category include farm labourers and farmers and those that fall into the 
second include merchants, traders and landlords. 
It is interesting to note that a number of personal characteristics show up as 
determinants of formal loans. For instance, women are less likely to have loans than 
are men. This may be because it is hard for women to obtain loans for cultural reasons 
from the formal sector. Indeed, in Egypt, it is usual for a woman to depend on one of 
her male relatives to manage either land or a project even if she owns it. 
Family commitments also appear to be important in determining who obtains loans in 
the formal financial sector. Those with large families are more likely to have formal 
sector loans, though this effect diminishes as the size of the family increases. This 
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may represent a returns to scale effect. Those who are married or widowed (as opposed 
to being a bachelor or divorced) are also more likely to have a formal loan. This may 
be indicative of the need to borrow if the individual has a large number of dependants. 
Perhaps not surprisingly the subjective reasons for not dealing with the financial sector 
prove to be statistically significant in determining whether or not the individual has 
dealings with the formal sector. If the individual has strong religious objections or 
feels that they lack the necessary collateral then they are less likely to have a formal 
loan. Individuals also do not borrow from the formal sector if they feel they are treated 
badly by this sector, feel the sector may become bankrupt, or if they feel that the costs 
incurred are too high. 
Finally, column 3 of Table 3 shows the effect of adding a dummy variable to the 
parsimonious equation if the individual concerned has a loan in the informal financial 
sector. Whilst it is recognised that this variable may well be endogenous it can be seen 
as indicative of some form of interaction between the markets. However, this variable 
proves to be insignificantly different from zero at the 90% level of significance. 
5. A Probit Analysis of the Informal Sector 
Another way of examining the relationship between the formal and the informal 
financial sectors is to look at those factors which determine whether an individual 
borrows from the informal financial sector, and then compare the results with those 
obtained in the previous section. The results of the probit analysis for the informal 
sector are in Table 4 column 1. 
As can be seen, the probit model seems to fit the data reasonably well, yielding 
a pseudo-R2 of 0.79. However, the LM statistic rejects the null of no 
Table 4: Demand for loans in the informal sector 
coefficient marginals coefficient marginals 
constant 2.18(3.566) 0.76(3.372) 2.12(3.442) 0.72(3.235) 
villages 
0.71(2.208) 0.25(2.180) 0.71(2.203) 0.24(2.173) 
Shahawy 1.34(3.434) 046(3.432) 1.34(3.429) 0.46(3.422) 
Mcnshàt 
Individual characteristics 
income/l000 0.28c-I(0.288) 0.96e-2(0.288) 0.1 Ic-I (0.108) 0.36e-2(0. 108) 
(incomcll000)2 0.48e-2(2.73 I) 0.1 le-2(2.855) 0.50e-2(2.827) 0.1 7e-2(3.0 18) 
living standard -0.25e-1(-2.556) -0.88e.2(-2.457) -0.26c-1(-2.620) -0.90e-2(-2.S00) 
rent land to 0.86(2.103) 0.29(2.091) 0.85(2.098) 0.29(2.083) 
savings/1000 -0.88(-3.559) -0.31(-4.142) -0.86(-3.428) -0.74(-3.816) 
main source of income 
wages, public sector -2.23(-3.820) -0.30(-2.906) -2.1 8(-3.663) -0.29(-2.734) 
-0.88(-2.922) -0.24(-2.758) -0.84(-2.763) -0.21 (-2.4 17) 
own gold -0.78(-2.062) -0.27(-2.052) .0.80(-2.081) -0.27(-2.071) 
Profession 
landlord / agricultural labourer) 
merchant/trader 0.65(2.087) 0.22(2.105) 0.58(1.833) 0.20(1.842) 
farmer 
government/public sector 1.24(2.403) 0.43(2.452) 1.17(2.196) 0.40(2.241) 
Household characteristics 
rural house -l .28(-3.75 I) -0.44(-3.783) -l .30(-3.7S 1) -0.44(-3.809) 
separate room -l.26(-2.302) -0.44(-2.312) -1.20(-2.186) -0.41(-2.193) 
Reasons for not dealine with the formal sector 
bureaucracy 
religious 
distance -0.69(-2.802) -0 .24(-2 .758) -0.62(-2.470) -0.2 1(-2.4 17) 
treatment 
bankruptcy 
0.53(2.060) 0.18(2.061) 0.62(2.252) 0.21(2.269) 
fonnalloan 0.32(1.120) 0.11(1.130) 
R2 0.79 0.79 
Heseroskedasticity 51.33 17 49.74 18 
t-ratios in brackets. 
figures in bold indicate degrees of freedom. 
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heteroskedasticity, indicating that the standard errors should be viewed with some 
caution. 
The first result that should be noticed from Table 4 is the dominance of financial 
variables in the determination of whether or not an individual has an informal loan, 
though the interpretation of the sign of these variables is more problematic. In the 
introduction, it was suggested that the informal financial sector might lend money to 
those individuals who have previously failed to obtain funds from the formal sector. 
Since it might be expected that those with little income or wealth are more likely to be 
refused formal loans then it is these people who would be expected to obtain informal 
loans. With regard to this prediction, the results are mixed. Those people whose living 
standard's is low are more likely to borrow from the informal sector as are those 
individuals with low levels of saving. This suggests that people prefer to fund 
themselves if at all possible, and will run down their savings rather than borrow- 
turning to the informal sector only as a last resort. This also helps to explain why the 
ownership of gold has a negative effect on the probability of having a loan. That is, 
individuals will liquidate their gold holdings if the need for funds arises. In contrast 
however, income has a positive and increasing effect on the probability of having an 
informal loan. It should be remembered however that we are observing not whether an 
individual desires a loan but whether or not an individual has a loan. Our observed 
variable is therefore a product both of the desire for a loan as well as success in 
getting a loan. The income variable may thus be reflecting the fact that high income 
earners have a greater ability to obtain informal finance. This might be for a number of 
reasons; firstly, lenders may think that are more likely to get back the principal in a 
reasonable period if the borrower has a high income; secondly, since informal loans 
are often obtained from relatives, and income is highly correlated between family 
Living standard is an index of the availability to the household of durable goods, water, toilet, transport and communication 
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members, then the income variable may be acting as an instrument for the fund of 
monetary resources available for the individual to draw on. 
Renting land to other individuals might also initially be thought to be an indicator of 
the wealth of the individual. However the agricultural land market in Egypt is highly 
regulated, with all rented land contracts being controlled by the Government. The 
reality is therefore that tenants are usually in a strong position. Renting land to other 
people might therefore be taken as an indicator of relative illiquidity rather than 
wealth. 
With regard to the main sources of income, individuals who have a waged income are 
less likely to borrow from IFMs. Since wages represent a more secure source of 
income than that obtained from projects, real estate or financial assets this might 
suggest that individuals are borrowing in the informal credit market to meet 
unexpected shortfalls in income. 
With regard to type of dwelling, those individuals who live in rural houses or separate 
rooms in shared houses are less likely to borrow from the informal financial market. 
These individuals are generally of low income and wealth. 
In summary, the picture obtained of those who borrow in the informal financial sector 
is complex. Whilst it is the case that financial variables prove to be key determinants 
of whether or not an individual has an informal loan, the pattern is not entirely 
consistent. Although it appears to be the case that those who are unlikely to obtain 
formal credit turn to the informal financial sector to obtain loans, those with very high 
incomes also borrow informally. This may reflect a higher success rate in loan 
'applications' on their part. 
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6. The Formal and the Informal Sectors Compared. 
Table 5 allows a comparison of those factors which affect the determination of loans in 
the informal and the formal financial sectors. Columns one and two contain the 
parsimonious results for the formal and the informal financial sectors respectively. 
Columns three and four then contain equations for the informal and formal financial 
sectors conditioned on a common subset of variables. This allows a strict comparison 
across the equations to be made. 
As has been mentioned previously, financial variables prove to be important in the 
determination of which individuals have loans in both the formal and the informal 
sectors. Thus, the level of income and savings appear in both equations. The 
ownership of assets appears to be more important from the point of view of obtaining 
loans in the formal sector, a result which is perhaps not suiprising given that the need 
for collateral is of much greater importance in this sector. Finally, personal 
characteristics seem to be of greater statistical importance in the determination of loans 
in the formal sector. 
Table 5: Demand for loans in the formal and informal sector: a comparison 
parsimonious probit model generalised probit model 
Informal Formal Informal Formal 
constant -2.18(3.566) -5.16(-2.925) 1.51(1.296) •6.64(-2.60l) 
villases 
Shahawy 1.34(3.434) -t.08(-I.943) 1.36(3.329) -0.23(-0.452) 
Shukr 0.71(2.208) 0.70(1.878) 0.99(1.376) 
Asneat 0.71 - I .25(- 1.947) 0.73(1.793) -0.42(-0.647) 
Menshat -l .03(I .692) 
Individual characteristics 
female -2.68(-2.148) 0.37(0.578) -3.14(-2.366) 
below general certificate I .08(2.057) 0.38(1.017) 1.49(2.119) 
married/widowed -l .64(-I .705) 0.37(0.613) -I .73(- 1.620) 
incomc/1000 0.28e- 1(0.288) 0.50(3.033) 0.74e- 1(0.695) 0.48(2.144) 
(income/I 000)2 0.48e-2(2.73 I) -0.82(-I .802) 0.35e-3(0.091) -0.58e-2(-0.976) 
own land 1.37(3.603) -0.77(-0.240) 1.66(3.201) 
rent land from 2.13(3.783) -0.34(-0.853) 2.50(3.520) 
total assets/I 000 -0.1 7e-1(-3.058) 0.42e-2(0.708) -O.26e- I (-2.699) 
living standard -0.25e- 1(-2.556) -0.3 Ic-I (-2.617) 0.1 7e- 1(0.905) 
rent land to 0.86(2.103) 0.58(1.156) 0.76(0.622) 
savings/l000 -0.88(-2.992) -0.99(-3.625) -0.95(-3.504) -0.99(-2.856) 
loan refused 2.28(2.695) 0.2 1(0.500) 2.50(2.494) 
main source of income 
wages, public sector -2.23(-3.820) -2.23(-3.399) 0.45(0.536) 
ag 
-0.88(-2.922) -0.83(-2.022) -0.69e.I(-0. 103) 
own gold -O.78(-2.062) 0.93(1.471) -O.84(-2. 124) 0.97(1.301) 
Profession 
landlord/agricultural labourer 0.65(2.087) 2.30(2.980) 0.47(1.038) 2.86(2.936) 
merchant/trader 0.65 3.85(4.119) 0.94(1.696) 4.4 1(3.725) 
farmer 0.65 2.27(3.347) 0.73(1.618) 3.14(3.479) 
government/public sector 1.24(2.403) 2.94(3.945) 1.37(2.376) 2.79(3.175) 
Household characteristics 
household size 1.26(2.705) 0.69e-I (0.242) 1.13(2.082) 
household size sq. -0.87(-2.474) -0.49e-2(-0.2 16) -0.75e- I (-1.821) 
rural house -I.28(-3.751) -I. 15(-3.1 18) 0.90e-l(0. 188) 
separate room -I.26(-2.302) -1.02(-l.766) -6.07(-0.122) 
Reasons for not dealina with the formal sector 
bureaucracy -0.69(-2.802) 1.34(2.377) -0.30(-0.734) 1.46(1.970) 
distance -0.69 1.34 -0.55(-0.510) 1.96(1.154) 
religious -0.69 -2.29(-4.175) -0.31(-1.069) -2.57(-3.859) 
treatment -0.69 -2.07(-1 .841) -0.32(-0.549) -2.84(-1 .848) 
bankruptcy -0.69 - I .04(- 1.644) 0.39e-I (0.053) .1 .36(-l .129) 
cost 0.53(2.060) -1 .29(-2.804) 0.11(0.348) - I .47(.2.754) 
collateral 0.53 - I .04(-2. 131) 0.27(0.7 52) -0.71 (-1.214) 
confiscation 0.11(0.166) -0. 14(-0. 145) 
taxes -0.29(-0.603) 0.63e-I(0.089) 
no need -3.00(-2.572) -0.2l(-0.486) -3.79(-2.189) 
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7. Bivanate Pmbit Estimations 
In an attempt to further assess the interaction of the formal and the informal fmancial 
sectors, the next section models the determination of loans in the two sectors jointly. 
The approach adopted will be the bivariate probit model, which has the following 
econometric specification: 
I 1 





Where, for the purposes of our model: 
= propensity of an individual to have a loan with the formal sector 
= observed formal sector status 
= propensity of an individual to have a loan with the informal sector 
= observed informal sector status. 
Thus, each individual is assumed to possess a propensity to have an informal sector 
loan (y1) and although this is not directly observable, when the propensity becomes 
positive then the individual is observed to have a loan. This is identical to the 
standard latent variable approach for probit models. However, in the bivariate probit 
framework the individual is also assumed to possess a propensity to have a formal 
sector loan (yr,) which again is observed if the propensity is positive. The fact that the 
propensity to have a loan in the informal and the formal sectors may be correlated is 
allowed for by letting the error terms in the membership and coverage equations be 
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correlated (with correlation coefficient p). The results of the bivariate pro bit model 
are shown in Table 6. 
As can be seen the effect of allowing the error terms of the formal and the informal 
sector equations to be correlated is small, with the size and the sign of the coefficients 
remaining approximately the same as when the equations were estimated using single 
equation techniques. Further, although there is some evidence of collinearity amongst 
the variables causing the t-ratios of the coefficients to fall, the correlation coefficient 
has a very low level of statistical significance. From these equations there does not 
appear to be a simple correlation, either positive or negative, between the propensities 
to have loans in the two markets. 
One explanation of the failure of the bivariate probit model to pick up an interaction 
of the formal and the formal financial sectors may be found in the detailed results of 
the survey. These indicate that informal financial transactions are heterogeneous and 
occur in several sub-markets that make up the informal financial market. It seems to 
be possible to distinguish between four categories of informal finance: occasional 
lending; regular lending; inter-linked credit; finance through collective arrangements. 
Under occasional lending we include all direct intermittent loans by individuals with 
a temporary surplus of funds This type of lending arises in the absence of personal 
consumer credit and small enterprise loans. These are usually between relatives and 
friends whose relations are governed not by market mechanisms but rather by social 
relations. These loans are predominantly interest free for consumption purposes 
though they are sometimes based on the principle of profit and loss sharing in the 
case of production purposes. Generally they have flexible terms and no collateral 
requirements. 
16 Sec Ohate (1992), p23. 
Table 6: Demand for loans in the formal and informal sector 
bivanate probit model bivariate probit 
informal formal informal formal 
constant 2. 5(2.834) -5.04(- 1.539) 1.50(0.873) -651 (-1.051) 
Shahawy 1.33(2.899) 1.36(2.425) 0.96(0.741) 
Shukr 0.71(1.763) -l.13(-l.31 1) 0.69(1.289) .0.31(-0.339) 
Asneat 0.7! -l.25(-l.265) 0.72(1.328) -0.46(--0.490) 
Menshat -l.0l(1.118) 
landlord/agricultural, labourer 0.65(1.791) 2.33(2.039) 0.46(0.787) 2.92(1.468) 
merchant/trader 0.65 3.80(2.421) 0.98(1.165) 4.40(1.853) 
farmer 0.65 2.25(2.372) 0.72(1.159) 3.15(1.982) 
govt/public sector 1.22(1.885) 2.97(2.453) 1.35(1.589) 2.81(1.590) 
household size 1.23(1.528) 0.83e.1(0.200) 1.10(0.908) 
household size sq. -0.84(-1.446) -0.64e-2(-0.206) -0.73e-I(-0.838) 
female -2.69(-l.082) 0.38(0.408) -3.09(-0.967) 
below general certificate 1.09(1.503) 0.38(0.668) 1.52(0.927) 
marned/widowed -I .69(-0.904) 0.35(0.464) -l .74(-0.661) 
rural house -1 .26(-2.726) -1. 14(-l .937) 0.10(0.096) 
separate room -1.20(-l.975) -l.02(-1.507) -5.94(-0.000) 
income/I 000 0.32e-l (0.207) 0.51(2.169) O.74e-l (0.405) 0.48(1.217) 
(income/bOO) 0.47e-2(0.479) -0.80(-0.9 13) 0.39e-3(0.036) -0.53e-2(-0.457) 
own land 1.41(2.787) -0.78(-0.l 17) 1.78(1.891) 
rent land from 2.13(2.377) -0.30(-0.500) 2.48(1.686) 
total assets/1000 -0.1 8e-l(-2 441) 0.42e-2(0.378) -0.26e-1(-1 .398) 
living standard -0.26e-1(-2.024) -0.32e-l (-1.824) 0.1 6e-1(0.454) 
rent band to 0.84(2.087) 0.58(0.886) 0.70(0.229) 
savings/1000 -0.88(-2.3 17) -0.99(-2. 123) -0.94(-2.0 16) -1 .0O(- 1.375) 
loan refused 2.32(1.526) 0.20(0.360) 2.59(1.284) 
wages public sector -2.20(.2.903) -2.2I(-2.345) 0.53(0.377) 
wages private sector -0.88(-2.552) 0.83(- 1.561) -0.1 4(-0. 123) 
wages from agriculture -0.88 
religious -0.69(-2.29 1) -2.38(-2.88 1) -0.30(-0.788) -2.67(-1 .729) 
treatment -0.69 -2.1 0(- 1.173) -0.32(-0.438) -2.97(-0.970) 
bankruptcy -0.69 -1.1 5(-l .311) 0.36e-1(0.023) -1 .43(-0.576) 
distance -0.69 1.35(1.606) -0.51 (-0.163) 2.05(0.485) 
bureaucracy -0.69 1.35 -0.28(-0.474) 1.51(0.982) 
cost 0.53(2.060) -l.24(-I.874) 0.12(0.245) -l.40(-l.530) 
collateral 0.53 -1.1 0(-l .599) 0.25(0.496) -0.82(-0.745) 
confiscation 0.13(0.095) -0.lO(-0.040) 
taxes -0.29(-0.412) 0.65e-1(0.052) 
no need -2.99(-l.072) -0.19(-0.335) -3.86(-0.834) 
own gold -0.78(-l .743) 1.01(1.012) -0.83(-l .668) 1.03(0.757) 
p 0.21(0.549) 0.21(0.378) 
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Informal lending can take a more regular form if there exist specialised 
moneylenders or pawnbrokers. A typical money lender utilises his close knowledge 
of the borrower and often faces no competition in providing the service given this 
information advantage he possesses. Consequently loans obtained from this source 
tend to be relatively expensive, as the demand curve is inelastic. Such loans are 
considered by potential borrowers as a last resort 18, Collateral is not of great 
importance in this type of informal finance unless, of course, the loan is obtained 
from a pawnbroker. However, this type of lending is very rare in Egypt and is not 
represented in our sample. 
Inter-linked credit occurs when two or more interdependent exchanges are 
simultaneously agreed upon in the form of a bundled deal 19 The lender extends 
credit to the borrower against the latter's commitment to sell crops, in the case of 
trader-farmer relationship, or providing labour service, in the case of employer- 
worker. Under inter-linked credit arrangements, the continuing relationship in the 
other market acts as a substitute for collateral and reduces transaction costs and 
default risk. The loans in our sample which were in the form of 'bundled deals' 
might however be better described as 'forward sales'. 
Finally informal finance may also take the form of collective arrangements. An 
example of these arrangements is credit unions in which a group of individuals 
regularly, or irregularly, deposit funds with a chosen leader. The pooled savings are 
then lent to the group's members, and in some cases to non members, when they 
apply for a loan. Members are charged no interest or very low interest. The most 
common form of collective arrangements is Rotating Savings and Credit 
Associations- which are known in the financial development literature by the 
17 See Timberg and Aiyar (1984) for an extensive analysis of this type of informal finance in India. 
18 See Montiel, Agënor and Haque, op cit., p. 13. 
l9 See Bell (1988) for a comprehensive analysis of inter-linked transactions. 
20 
acronym RoSCA. RoSCA continues to be an important instrument of savings and a 
significant source of credit20. 
Thus it may be seen that in Egypt the informal financial sector is not a homogenous 
one. Some forms of borrowing are subject to the payment of either explicit (under the 
profit sharing principle) or implicit interest (usufruct loans21). Other forms of informal 
borrowing are not market determined but are governed by the social relationship 
between the lender and the borrower. Given this, it might be expected that some forms 
of informal finance would interact differently with the formal sector than others. 
Some indication of the differing role of the formal and informal sectors may be gauged 
from Table 7. As can be seen, people who borrow from one market rarely also borrow 
from the other financial sector for the same purpose, though this is more common if 
the loan is for production purposes. In addition, borrowing of loans typically tends to 
be for business purposes in the formal financial sector (agricultural, trade, or industry), 
whereas a large proportion of the loans in the informal sector are for consumption and 
social purposes. This helps to explain why the bivariate probit specification failed to 
pick up any simple correlation between the decisions which are made in the informal 
sector and those which are made in the formal financial sector. That is, the informal 
sector is acting as a complement to formal loans for some categories of spending and 
as a substitute in others. This implies that a future study will need to distinguish 
between the use to which the loans will be put. 
20 
See Besley, Coate and Lowly (1993) for an analysis of the economics of ROSCAs and for an analysis of ROSCAs in Egypt. 
21 
see Mohieldin (1994). 
See Flora and Yatopoulos for an analysis of usufruct loans and Mohieldin (1994) for some examples from Egypt. 
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Table 7- The purpose for which loans are borrowed in the formal and 
informal sectors. 
Informal Sector 
none production consumption Emmigration social other 
Format Sector 
none 83 10 27 4 14 2 
agricultural operations 21 5 2 1 2 0 
trade 3 5 0 0 1 0 
industrial 0 1 1 0 0 0 
housing 0 0 0 0 0 0 
consumption 3 0 3 0 0 0 
social 2 1 0 0 1 0 
other 3 1 1 0 1 1 
115 23 34 5 19 5 
It also appears from the results obtained in sections 4 and 5 that there is a need to 
distinguish between the demand for loans and the ability to obtain one i.e. the supply. 
This is so for both the formal and the informal sector, as there is evidence of credit 
constraints in each market. It was argued in section 5 that one group of people 
obtaining loans in the informal market are those without the necessary income or 
assets to obtain formal finance. It is also the case however that a significant number of 
people who can obtain loans from the formal sector, also borrow from the informal 
sector. This may be because, although they can obtain formal finance, they face 
constraints on the amount that they can borrow. They therefore turn to IFMs to meet 
any shortfall in loan requirements. Thus it may be argued that the informal financial 
sector is acting as a safety net in two respects. However, whilst loans in the informal 
sector appear to be determined more on the basis of social relations than do formal 
loans, financial considerations are far from redundant. It therefore seems likely that a 
significant number of people on low incomes would desire a loan but are unable to 
obtain it from either sector due either to lack of access to funds or due to doubts about 
their ability to repay. 
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8. Conclusions 
This paper has examined empirically the markets for formal and informal credit in 
Egypt, using a dataset which was specifically collected for the purpose. The analysis 
found that the informal financial sector was more active than the formal sector, 
though the loans obtained were generally smaller. 
The paper then examined what factors determine whether or not a person borrows 
from the formal and the informal financial sectors. These equations were well 
determined and indicated that financial considerations were of primary importance in 
the determination of loans in both sectors. The interaction between the two markets is 
far from simple however, and no simple correlation exists between having a formal 
sector loan and having an informal sector loan. This is not to suggest however that no 
interaction occurs between the markets. It was argued that future work will need to 
take account both of the use to which the loan will be put and the interaction of 
constraints on the ability to borrow in both markets. The tentative conclusion of this 
study would be to suggest that, far from being harmful to the process of economic 
development, informal credit markets appear to at least partially relax the credit 
constraints imposed on individuals by the formal sector. The funds available for loans 
in the informal sector are however limited and there is evidence that some form of 
market failure persists. 
Appendix Table One: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dcv. Minimum Maximum 
Shukr 0.40000 0.49113 0.0000 1.000 
Shahawy O.I5000 0.35797 0.0000 1.000. 
Asneat 0.25000 0.43410 0.0000 1.000 
Menshát 0.00 0.40100 0.0000 1.000 
Formal loan 0.30000 0.45941 0.0000 1.000 
borrowed informally 0.42500 0.49558 0.0000 1.000 
Household size 5.6600 2.0236 1.000 11.00 
Age 45.975 12.411 -0.057 79.00 
Female 0.40000E-01 0.19645 0.0000 1.000 
type of dwelling 
apartment 0.26500 0.44244 0.0000 1.000 
villa/house 0.17500 0.38092 0.0000 1.000 
rural house 0.49500 0.50123 0.0000 1.000 
separate room 0.S0000E-0l 0.2 1849 0.0000 1.000 
informal housing 0.15000E-0l 0.12186 0.0000 1.000 
other 0.00000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
possession of dwelling 
owned 0.81000 0.39329 0.0000 1.000 
rented 0.12500 0.33155 0.0000 1.000 
furnished and rented 0.99748E-01 0.0000 1.000 
with job 0.40000E-01 0.19645 0.0000 1.000 
squattered 0. I0000E-0l 0.99748E-0 I 0.0000 1.000 
other 0.50000E-02 • 0.70711E-01 0.0000 1.000 
Occuoation. 
landlord 0.55000E-01 0.22855 0.0000 1.000 
agricultural labourer 0.18000 0.385 IS 0.0000 1.000 
artisan 0.14500 0.35298 0.0000 1.000 
merchant/trader 0.95000E-01 0.29395 0.0000 1.000 
govt/public employee 0.24000 0.42815 0.0000 1.000 
private sector employce0.55000E-01 0.228 55 0.0000 1.000 
farmer 0.16000 0.36753 0.0000 1.000 
unemployed 0.45000E-0l 0.20782 0.0000 1.000 
Other 0.25000E-01 0.15652 0.0000 1.000 
education 
below age 0.00000 0.00000 0.0000 0.0000 
illiterate 0.26000 0.43973 0.0000 1.000 
read/write (barely) 0.30500 0.46 156 0.0000 1.000 
below general certifica*eO.15500 0.36281 0.0000 1.000 
general certificate 0.18500 0.38927 0.0000 1.000 
highereducation 0.95000E-0l 0.29395 0.0000 1.000 
marital status 
below age (14) 0.00000 0.00000 0.0000 0.0000 
bachelor 0.60000E-0l 0.23808 0.0000 1.000 
married 0.88500 0.31982 0.0000 1.000 
divorced 0.50000E-02 0.7071 IE-Ol 0.0000 1.000 
widowed 0.50000E-0l 0.21849 0.0000 0.0000 
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Financial 
Income 5716.0 8859.9 1000. 0.8000E+05 
Own land 1.8152 11.185 0.0000 150.0 
Rent land to (feddans) 0.83 150E-0l 0.47661 0.0000 5.000 
Rent land from 0.17795 0.40630 0.0000 2.500 
Total assets 0.l469lE+06 0.71075E+06 0.0000 0.9585E+07 
Savings 1534.8 4609.2 0.0000 0.4000E+05 
Refused formal loan 0.10000 0.30075 0.0000 1.000 
Own gold 0.87000 0.33715 0.0000 1.000 
Living standard 40.674 22.535 2.040 95.92 
Main source of income 
wages, public sector 0.25000 0.434 10 0.0000 1.000 
wages, private sector 0.13500 0.34258 0.0000 1.000 
wages agriculture 0.36500 0.48264 0.0000 1.000 
Projects in agric/induso.60000E-0l 0.23 808 0.0000 1.000 
other projects 0.85000E.01 0.27958 0.0000 1.000 
real estate 0.00000 0.00000 0.0000 0.0000 
financial assets 0.50000E-02 0.707l1E-01 0.0000 1.000 
other 0.10000 0.30075 0.0000 l.000 
Strong Reason for not dealing with the formal sector 
Religion 0.28000 0.45013 0.0000 1.000 
Distance 0.25000E.0l 0.15652 0.0000 1.000 
Treatment 0.50000E-O1 0.21849 0.0000 1.000 
Bureaucracy 0.14000 0.34786 0.0000 1.000 
Cost 0.54500 0.49922 0.0000 1.000 
Lack of collateral 0.39000 0.48897 0.0000 1.000 
Fear of Bankruptcy 0.11000 0.31367 0.0000 1.000 
Fearof confiscation 0.13000 0.33715 0.0000 1.000 
fearoftaxes 0.17500 0.38092 0.0000 1.000 
No need 0.13500 0.34258 0.0000 1.000 
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